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Subprime Mortgage Loans: An Overview Analysis on the 
Loan Process, and Statistics Surrounding the Vulnerable 
Borrowers in Today’s Economy 
 
 




This paper analyzes mortgage loans granted under less than optimal conditions, 
known as subprime mortgage loans. The author explores this as a phenomenon that 
has affected in particular minorities, and low-income Americans. In recent years, 
people eager to enter the hosing market –many of them first time buyers– borrowed 
from reckless lenders sums of money, and purchased property, well beyond their 
means. Borrowers were often unaware –or had limited understanding– of the impli-
cations of the terms of their mortgages. Substantial increments in interest rates after 
an initial grace period and the plummeting of the housing market cause thousands 
and thousands of borrowers to default in their payments in what has been portrayed 




The taking of unbelievably reachable sub-
prime mortgage loans has occurred all over 
America, and global investors have jumped 
in on the band wagon too. Even-
tually an overheated economy 
and a wildly unregulated market 
has resulted in levels of delin-
quent accounts of historical pro-
portions. The consequences of 
not paying off a high mortgage 
loan can be heartbreaking, and all 
stakeholders involved suffer if 
the loans are not paid. The payoff 
however for receiving a loan, 
selling a loan, and buying a loan 
can attract all stakeholders who want to 
profit for various reasons. 
 This purpose of these pages is to explore 
this phenomenon that can be referred to as 
the melting of the subprime mortgage mar-
ket, hoping that the reflections here in-
cludeed may help people in the future not to  
fall victim of reckless lending practices. 
Some people affected by the crisis were less 
fortunate than others: 
there seems to be 
enough evidence to sup-
port the contention that 
minorities were particu-
larly targeted for sub-
prime mortgage loans. 
This reflection will 
hopefully shed light on 




Buying new home can be exciting, nerve 
wracking, and complicated all at the same 
time. A potential homebuyer generally 
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weighs in the timing of when they want to 
buy a home, they weigh in how much 
money they will need to buy a house, and 
they also consider who they want to buy a 
home mortgage from. These considerations 
for buying a house are important factors, but 
what if someone took care of all of these 
factors at an initially low price? Low prices 
for costly investments, such as buying a 
home, sound like a dream come true for po-
tential homebuyers. The creation of sub-
prime mortgage loans would eventually lead 
to potential homebuyers owning their own 
home, and even better, they would own 
these homes at a low initial buy in rate. Af-
ter a homeowner completes the process of 
taking out a large loan for the home, they 
then would complete the mortgage process; 
the next step is to move in, and thus, start 
paying the mortgage for the new home. 
Suddenly though, homebuyers realize that 
their new home costs a lot of money, and 
having to work extra hard just to make the 
payments becomes grueling. This realization 
is currently plaguing homeowners who took 
out subprime mortgage loans, and unfortu-
nately, the cost of owning their homes now 
arts to be overbearing. 
onomy Before Subprime 
ortgage Loans 
transformation.” (Hal-






In the late sixties and early seventies, Amer-
ica was fresh off of the Civil-Rights move-
ment era. Minorities however were still be-
ing denied homes, and lenders themselves 
were denying minority’s credit and loans. 
This practice, known as “redlining,” was 
addressed by the Federal Government with a 
“Fair Housing Act of 1968, when private 
lenders did not suddenly end redlining and 
minority neighborhoods across the nation 
endured increasing distress as persistent dis-
crimination compounded the efforts of struc-
tural urban economic 
This issue would be addressed in the 
1980s, when the American economy was in 
a period of stagflation (a period of inflation, 
high unemployment, and low economic pro-
duction rate in Case and Fair, 1999, p. 405), 
the Reagan administration responded to the 
American economy by using ‘supply-side’ 
policies. This macroeconomic concept was 
used to give the American economy an in-
centive to, “work, save, and invest by lower-
ing tax rates.” (Case and Fair, 1999, p. 405) 
President Reagan also strongly supported 
anti-inflationary policies such as reducing 
tax-rates so that capital gain could get routed 
to the savers, the administration also 
claimed that cutting tax rates would give 
people with little income a chance to save. 
The Reagan Administration’s policies pro-
vided an open door to excessive claims and 
‘easy money’, yet the poor, including mi-
norities would still remain in the same fi-
nancial and housing state.” (Hendershott, 
2004, p. 282) Minorities and low-income 
families would not contribute to the housing 
market, and not necessarily by choice, until 
the 1990s.  
The Reagan Administration’s ‘supply-
side’ policies would however increase capi-
tal gain for future entrepreneurs, and before 
America knew it, the ‘dot com bubble’ 
would arrive. “Between 1995 and 2000, 
Internet stock prices soared and thousands of 
newly founded companies raised tens of bil-
lions of dollars from venture capitalists and 
others to pursue internet-related opportuni-
ties.” (Hendershott, 2004, p.282) This ven-
ture capital can be comparable to subprime 
mortgage loans in terms of the intents that 
such venture capitalists were aiming at dur-
ing the ‘dot com bubble.’ With Wall Street 
doing well during the boom, along with the 
local economy, Wall Street’s thoughts soon 
led to maximizing profits on a global scale. 
(Neo-classical assumption) As a result, sub-
prime mortgage loans were created.  
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The act of creating excessive and easily 
accessible loans would not only maximize 
profit for lenders and large banking institu-
tions, but it would increase a larger invest-
ment relationship with the global economy. 
The interest rates that come with subprime 
mortgage loans would be considered 
“pooled mortgages.’ Mortgage institutions 
would accumulate these debt interest rate 
gains (attained from borrowers) and sell 
them as investments to global investors 
(Hendershott, 2004, p. 282). [Also known as 
Collaterized Debt Obligations]. Global in-
vestors, in turn, would ‘goose’ the invest-
ments by investing in Wall Street. Global 
investors were essentially investing in debt 
that was not even paid off yet by subprime 
mortgage borrowers.” (Leonhardt, 2008, pp. 
1-2) 
 
Subprime Mortgage Loans: 
“Subprime” in mortgage lending refers to 
loans that do not meet certain credit scales 
that larger credit or loan companies require. 
Subprime mortgage loans are sold in the 
secondary market, this term describes the 
sale of loans at wholesale price, usually in 
bulk, to subprime mortgage lenders from 
smaller lenders in the securitization market 
(separating mortgage loans from original 
lender, this takes away the risk associated 
with the original lender and selling the 
mortgage loans to a third party, aka: the sec-
ondary market and subprime mortgage lend-
ing companies). These mortgage loans be-
came accessible to those who had bad credit 
and could not borrow on the primary market. 
The primary loan market consisted of bor-
rowers who could borrow large mortgage 
loans from large banking institutions based 
on a good credit scale and income rate. Sub-
prime mortgage loans were attractive for 
borrowers because they were disguised with 
low initial rates, and anyone who had low-
income, bad credit, or little experience in 
accessing mortgage loans would benefit be-
cause they could soon buy a home with little 
money. (Renuart, 2004, pp. 475-478) As 
mentioned above, the practice of redlining 
had historically occurred, but after the crea-
tion of subprime mortgage loans, reverse 
redlining became prevalent, and lenders 
were looking for anyone and everyone to do 
business with, so that they too, could maxi-
mize their profits.  
 
Dilemmas With Subprime Mortgage 
Lending 
 
Increased tax rates in 2000, along with an 
unforeseen housing market crash would lead 
to numerous dilemmas in the subprime 
mortgage market. To begin with borrowers, 
these were the people who initially took out 
a subprime mortgage loan at a low buy in 
rate, and a low interest rate, but by the end-
ing of the ‘dot com bubble’ came borrowers 
inability to pay such high interest rates on 
their subprime mortgage loans. The borrow-
ers had to foreclose their houses. Studies 
have shown that, “the rate at which loans go 
into foreclosure is significantly higher in the 
subprime market.”1 A micro study (Immer-
gluck, and Wiles, 2001) that I found in au-
thor Elizabeth Renuart’s article, “An Over-
view of Predatory Mortgage Lending Proc-
ess,” found that, “in Chicago, subprime 
loans lead to foreclosure at 20 or more times 
the rate then prime loans, aka loans given to 
those who had better credit with a less risky 
loan process involved, done through large 





The eagerness for subprime mortgage lend-
ers to sell mortgages would drive them to 
hasty loan practices. These practices would 
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in turn be targeted towards borrowers who 
were eager as well to attain a loan, and not 
surprisingly, minorities and low-income 
families would serve as much of my re-
search findings. In finding micro and macro 
research from pre-existing data, I could see 
that everyone involved in the subprime 
mortgage lending industry, including global 
investors, had intents of maximizing their 
profits at any cost, therefore by creating low 
buy in and interest rates, borrower’s demand 
for such loans became high. The lenders on 
the other hand were not only maximizing 
their profits by reverse redlining, but they 
were also selling these debts to global inves-
tors. Subprime mortgage loans sound like a 
beneficiary for everyone, but research stud-
ies have shown that borrowers ultimately are 




The subprime mortgage lenders are consid-
ered a “holder, trustee, or lender.” These 
stakeholders work for smaller capital based 
mortgage companies that take out a line of 
credit from larger banking institutions. The 
subprime mortgage lender, holder, or trustee 
act as middlemen for the small mortgage 
based companies. The subprime mortgage 
lender buys loans at a wholesale price from 
smaller originating loaners (securization). 
The secondary market, in which the small 
mortgage company, along with their lenders, 
buy wholesale mortgage loans from smaller 
lenders, and these smaller lenders are then 
completely out of the picture. Subprime 
mortgage lenders want to maximize their 
profit, and in doing so, they would target 
people who would sign loans with out 
knowing that hidden costs would included, 
and the lenders, along with their companies, 
could make even more profit off of these 
costs, not to mention the high interest rates 
that were to come for the victimized sub-
prime mortgage borrowers. (Canner and 
Passmore, 1999, pp. 709-724). 
 
Predatory Market Lending 
Lenders wanted to find people who tradi-
tionally have been denied mortgage loans; 
“Predatory mortgage lending” consisted of 
subprime mortgage lenders targeting spe-
cific borrowers. Such characteristics of bor-
rowers targeted would be low-income fami-
lies, people of color, (as my findings show 
mostly African Americans and Hispanics), 
and borrowers who did not understand or 
fully read the loan terms that were created 
by the lender. Two different micro studies in 
urban, metropolitan cities found that: 
 
 “In Philadelphia, 21 percent of loans was 
predatory. (The predatory lending consisted of 
manipulating property data, saying that there is 
more property value then there really is…thus 
making up property size). In Montgomery 
County Ohio, a random sample of mortgage 
loans associated with foreclosure revealed that 
21 percent were predatory mortgage loans. 
(Consisted of fluctuating interest rates, fixed 
verse adjustable rates).” (Canner and Passmore, 
1999, pp. 709-724) 
Marketing and the sale of loans is also a 
manipulation that predatory mortgage lend-
ers have partaken in. In one finding, the 
predatory Market is a push market targeting 
homeowners who are not generally seeking 
home loans. Within this Market, brokers and 
lenders are searching for soliciting borrow-
ers. The marketing practices include aggres-
sive solicitations in targeted neighborhoods 
that often include older and minority home-
owners, steering of borrowers to higher-rate 
lenders, door-to-door solicitation of business 
by home improvement contractors who ar-
range financing, and mobile home dealers 
acting as conduits for lenders.(Canner and 
Passmore, 1999, pp. 709-724)  In four cities 
in California (on a more local basis), the au-
thors reported that, “25 percent of the sur-
Culture Society and Praxis 
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veyed homeowners took out loans from a 
subsidiary or affiliate of a financial institu-
tion, yet none were referred to the prime 
lender for lower-cost loans. It is interesting 
to note that 60 percent of all surveyed 
homeowners believed that they had good or 
excellent credit.”(Stein and Libby, 2001) 
 Another interesting aspect when ana-
lyzing predatory loan practices are the loan 
terms and application process. In predatory 
mortgage lending, subprime lenders would 
falsify the borrower’s information, such as 
skewing their income level, inflating the 
value of a home through a partnership with 
an unscrupulous appraiser, and even worse, 
forging necessary signatures. (Renuart, 
2004, pp. 479-481) Loan terms are the other 
means in which predatory lenders can ma-
nipulate a borrower. In association to sub-
prime mortgage loans, high interest rates, 
high fees, high appraisal costs, back-dating 
of documents, charges for duplicative of 
services, and mandatory credit services, 
(Renuart, 2004, pp. 479-481) all serve as 




After reviewing predatory mortgage lending, 
it is easy to say that borrowers are victim-
ized by predatory subprime mortgage lend-
ing practices. In multiple findings, borrower 
characteristics showed that women and eld-
erly attributed for some sort of inequality in 
data findings. When authors and researchers 
addressed minority subprime mortgage lend-
ing, African Americans and Hispanics were 
the main victims. (At least that is what pre-
existing data shows) These characteristics 
are not representing the full range of Ameri-
can mortgage loan borrowers. The following 
data shows enough empirical data to prove 
that subprime mortgage loans have strategi-
cally been given to certain borrowers. 
 
Women, Elderly, Low-Income Families: 
 
This paper’s first findings showed that low 
and moderate-income families, women, and 
older homeowners may be overrepresented 
in the subprime and predatory markets. Ac-
cording to 1998 Home Mortgage Disclosure 
Act (HMDA) data, about 50 percent of the 
subprime refinancing market consisted of 
loans to low and moderate-income borrow-
ers, whereas this percentage was just about 
34 percent in the prime market. Women ac-
counted for 29 percent of subprime refinanc-
ing mortgages, compared with 43 percent of 
all subprime refinancing mortgages.” (U.S. 
Department of Treasury and U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development, 2008) When re-
financing happens, an already made sub-
prime mortgage loan gets adjusted and re-
newed with new terms, perhaps a fixed in-
terest rate, but even so, there is a large fee 
tacked on just for conducting a subprime 
mortgage refinancing loan. Interestingly 
enough, age seemed to play a factor in sub-
prime refinance loans, “those who were 45 
and older represent 56 percent of all sub-
prime refinancing borrowers, compared with 
a 43 percent of prime borrowers. Borrowers 
55 and older make up 35 percent of sub-
prime borrowers alone.” (U.S. Department of 
Treasury and U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, 2008) 
 When examining the general bor-
rower characteristics of subprime mortgage 
loans, low-income families located in met-
ropolitan areas seemed to be targeted heav-
ily. When thinking about low-income fami-
lies in need of a home, it is about housing 
wealth equity. Housing wealth and equity, in 
the case of low-income families, is based on 
educational attainment, physical and cogni-
tive functioning, occupation of employment, 
and horizon planning.”(Flippen, 2001, pp. 
134-136) This kind of data would explain 
the reasoning for targeted characteristics of 
borrowers, especially low-income families 
where, contributing to the fact that they are 
low-income, generally human capital is hard 
CS&P Vol 7. Num 2  Fall 2008 
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to attain due to the lack of resources needed 
to move up in the work and educational 
force. 
 To further explain the case of low-income 
families as victims of  predatory mortgage 
lending and subprime mortgage loan proc-
esses, low-income parents who support their 
families work at jobs where there hourly 
wage, or wages in general are low. For ex-
ample, in labor unions across America, labor 
strategies by employees are being taken to 
the next level such as unionization occur-
ring.(Offner, 2003, pp. 203-217) This proc-
ess, if completed successfully, could in-
crease the income of a low-income family, 
but in general terms, such processes that 
form resistance to American corporations 
fail due to American corporation’s power to 
simply hire other employees. This form of 
resistance however, is important to point 
out, because if low-income immigrant work-
ers in the unionization process, form resis-
tance to predatory mortgage lending, and 
subprime mortgage lending practices, maybe 





The discussion of income plays a role in my 
research findings for African Americans and 
subprime mortgage loans. The issue of tar-
geting race for subprime mortgage loans as 
opposed to “credit risk” characteristics for 
borrowers is shown in a national study con-
ducted by Paul Calem, Kevin Gillen, and 
Susan Wachter in 2002. The researchers 
found that African Americans are repre-
sented disproportionately in the subprime 
market, even at upper income levels. They 
continued to find that, “Lower-income 
blacks receive 2.4 times as many subprime 
loans as lower-income whites. However, the 
upper-income blacks receive 3 times as 
many subprime loans as whites with compa-
rable income.” (Calem, Gillen, and Wachter, 
2002, p. 14)  
These facts alone are alarming, because 
regardless of income, African Americans are 
still more likely to be targeted for subprime 
mortgage loans. These researchers found a 
“statistically significant relationship such 
that African American borrowers, regardless 
of the neighborhood where they are located, 
have relatively high likelihood of obtaining 
a subprime loan compared to a prime loan.” 
In 2002, a micro study conducted by Ken 
Zimmerman found, “New Jersey Blacks are 
2.5 times more likely to be provided sub-
prime loans than whites.”(Zimmerman, 
2002) These findings tend to highlight the 
metropolitan cities, but “high concentrations 
of subprime lending and racial disparities in 
subprime lending exist in all regions through 
out the United States and in metropolitan 




Researchers had similar findings with His-
panics in comparison to African Americans. 
In the same report by, Paul Calem, Kevin 
Gillen, and Susan Wachter in 2002, their 
findings also concluded that, “lower income 
Hispanics receive 1.4 times as many sub-
prime loans as lower income-whites, while 
the upper-income Hispanics receive 2.2 
times as many subprime loans as upper-
income whites.”(Calem, Gillen, and Wa-
chter, 2002, p. 14) Income level for Hispan-
ics played a little role in the deciding factor 
for subprime mortgage lending as well. An-
other micro study conducted by Ira Gold-
stein showed that, areas within Philadelphia 
with a higher potential vulnerability to 
predatory lending tended to have greater 
concentrations of foreclosure sales; areas 
that are predominantly African American 
and/ or Hispanic also tended to have higher 
concentrations of foreclosure sales and were 
more vulnerable to predatory lend-
Culture Society and Praxis 
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ing.”(Calem, Gillen, and Wachter, 2002, p. 
14) This micro study can support this paper 
claims that the effect of region on housing is 
also markedly different across groups. This 
claim is also true for regions such as in the 
Northeast and West relative to the South, is 
significantly stronger among blacks and 
Hispanics than it is among whites. This too, 
suggests the role of discrimination in un-
dermining minority housing wealth. “In 
housing markets characterized by high entry 
costs, where average debt-to-income ratios 
are higher and loans more risky, blacks and 
Hispanics are more adversely affected then 
whites.”(Flippen, 2001, p. 136) 
 
Interest Rates (APR’s) and Minorities: 
 
An interesting study conducted by Chenoa A 
Flippen in the Spring of 2004 comprised of 
an aggregate table that displays interest rates 
and minorities compared to Whites. In the 
realm of predatory mortgage lenders in the 
subprime mortgage lending process, they 
can create loan terms with interest rates that 
are not fixed. These interest rates fluctuate 
based on mortgage payments made each 
month, and some interest rates will fluctuate 




2004-2005 Aggregate Count of Subprime Mortgage Representing APR Rates for African Ameri-
cans, Hispanics and Whites 
 












 African American 7.22 43.60% 8.48 6.25 
 Hispanic 6.58 33.26% 7.86 5.94 
 White Non-Hispanic 6.03 17.22% 7.83 5.65 
2004 
African American Minus White Non-
Hispanic 1.2 26.38% 0.65 0.6 
 Hispanic Minus White Non-Hispanic 0.56 16.04% 0.03 0.29 
 African American 7.99 44.54% 9.57 6.72 
 Hispanic 7.45 34.73% 9.24 6.5 
 White Non-Hispanic 6.71 16.28% 9.07 6.25 
2005 
African American Minus White Non-
Hispanic 1.28 28.26% 0.5 0.47 




This table includes mean, or average, per-
centage rates that minorities APR compari-
sons, and it clearly shows that minority bor-
rowers pay higher APRs than non-minority 
borrowers. In 2004, the mean APR of Afri-
can American borrowers is 120 basis points 
above White non-Hispanic borrowers and 
the mean APR of Hispanic borrowers is 56 
basis points above White non-Hispanic bor-
rowers.18 In 2005, these differences grow to 
128 basis points above White non Hispanic  
 
borrowers for African American borrowers, 
and 74 basis points above White non-
Hispanic borrowers for Hispanic borrowers. 
(Flippen, 2001, p. 136) These points show a 
disparity between all three ethnicities, and 
just for the 2004-05 year, Whites had at least 
one percent lower APR’s compared to both 
African Americans and Hispanics.  
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Consistency of Data, Suggestions, Conclu-
sion 
 
The consistency of this paper’s findings 
from study to study raises the real question 
of whether discrimination and steering, ac-
count more for placement in the subprime 
market. Sociological explanations as to why 
African Americans, Hispanics, women, and 
low-income families choose subprime mort-
gage loan could be related to home owning 
equity and wealth. Factors such as educa-
tion, employment, preference, location of 
neighborhoods, and human capital access all 
contend with my notion that minorities, 
women, and low-income families are vic-
tims of subprime predatory mortgage lend-
ing practices. The practices alone act as the 
mechanism, and the subprime loan itself es-
sentially created the dilemma of hasty loan 
practices from the beginning. Lenders who 
want to maximize their profits by ruthlessly 
targeting people who are not capable of pay-
ing off a mortgage loan, needs to come to an 
end.  
The secondary market, and subprime 
mortgage lenders are middle men to mort-
gage companies that also want to maximize 
their profits. Borrowers are unable to make 
payments to the lenders, and lenders are sell-
ing mortgage debt to global investors. 
Global investors are investing money that 
does not even exist. These investors are in-
capable of controlling the American econ-
omy; including the American economy’s 
interest rates and housing market. Subprime 
mortgage loans should be defeated all to-
gether. If a specific borrower has low-
income, or they lack resources to make 
payments, loaning them a large amount of 
money would not be a good idea in the first 
place. Lenders are putting themselves at risk 
due to their eagerness for profiteering.  
The federal government does have regula-
tions to protect unlawful predatory mortgage 
lending, but low-income families do not 
have the money to pay a lawyer to defend 
their case. Many subprime mortgage bor-
rowers are unaware that they were even vic-
tims of predatory mortgage lending prac-
tices. The only awareness that is brought to 
the federal government’s attention are court 
cases, which is not occurring enough com-
pared to the amount of subprime mortgage 
borrowers’ homes going into foreclosure. 
This issue of victimizing borrowers can only 
be stopped through awareness, and third par-
ties who watch over the loan process should 
not be affiliated with the subprime mortgage 
lender, or their company. This third party 
could act as the mediator, and they should 
be required for all loan practices as it is.  
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